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Abstract - Conventional centralised information fu-
sion and control architectures will be challenged by
developments in sensor networks that allow sophisti-
cated autonomous sensors, owned by diﬀerent stake-
holders with individual goals, to interact and share
information. Given this, we advocate the use of tools
and techniques from computational mechanism de-
sign (CMD), a ﬁeld at the intersection of computer
science, game theory and economics, to address the
challenges posed by these networks. In particular,
CMD allows us to engineer networks with desirable
system-wide properties, in which sensors act as ra-
tional selﬁsh agents, each attempting to fulﬁll their
own individuals goals through the exchange of obser-
vations and information. In this paper, we present
our work developing such networks. Speciﬁcally, we
discuss our development of a generic and principled
information valuation metric for sensor networks
and we report our experiences applying it within a
real world information fusion sensor network sce-
nario.
Keywords: sensor network, information economy, multi-
agent system, computational mechanism design, data fu-
sion.
1 Introduction
Wireless micro-sensor networks, in which small cheap
sensors are distributed within large and possibly hostile
environments, are increasingly seen as attractive solu-
tions to the problem of wide-area monitoring in envi-
ronmental, security and military applications [1, 2, 3].
To date, most research has considered small experi-
mental networks, in which a centralised data collection
architecture has been implemented. That is, the indi-
vidual sensors have little autonomy and simply send
their data, observations or information to a central
point at which it is fused, aggregated or acted upon.
However, this approach is likely to be challenged
within future networks. As sensors become more so-
phisticated and are able to reconﬁgure themselves to
make more eﬀective use of their local resources (e.g.
managing their own sampling and reporting schedule
to make the most eﬀective use of battery power), it
becomes increasingly likely that attempting to opti-
mise the performance of the entire network using a cen-
tralised control regime will run into severe processing
and communication bottlenecks. In addition, as sen-
sors become ubiquitous within the environment, and
thus sensors owned by diﬀerent stakeholders have the
possibility of exchanging observations and information
(in order resolve uncertainty in their own observations,
to extend their observation range or to relay observa-
tions to a third party) it becomes increasingly diﬃcult
to identify where such a centralised point of control
can be located.
Thus, against this background, in this paper we re-
port on the challenges of applying agent-based con-
trol within sensor networks [4]. Speciﬁcally, we present
our work using techniques from computational mech-
anism design [5], a ﬁeld at the intersection of com-
puter science, game theory and economics, to engineer
sensor networks with predictable and desirable proper-
ties that can operate eﬀectively, even when the sensors
within the network have individual goals that they are
acting autonomously and selﬁshly to achieve. We de-
scribe a generic and principled metric for valuing obser-
vations made by these sensors, and we show that this
metric allows us to use standard results from mech-
anism design to engineer these systems. We present
an example of these techniques in operation in a simu-
lated aerial surveillance scenario in which sensors with
individual goals make eﬃcient use of a limited global
resource (in this case, the limited bandwidth of the
communication network that connects the sensors to-
gether).
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows.
In section 2 we describe in more detail current sen-
sor networks and discuss the advances that will chal-
lenge the conventional control architectures. In section
3 we present our valuation metric and describe how this
metric is applied within computational mechanism de-
sign. In section 4 we present a detailed description of
our aerial surveillance scenario, and ﬁnally, we discuss
future work and conclude in section 5.
2 Sensor Networks
Recent years have seen an explosion in the develop-
ment of small experimental sensor networks. These
have been demonstrated for purposes as diverse as ra-Figure 1: Schematic of the wireless network used in the Glacsweb project and a photograph of the actual sensors
embedded within the glacier.
diation monitoring [2], detecting sniper ﬁre in urban
combat environments [3] and helping to detect and
predict ﬂoods in river estuaries [6]. Since these net-
works have typically served as test-beds to enable the
development of the sensor technology, most have used
conventional data collection and distribution architec-
tures in which sensor data is collected, fused (or aggre-
gated) and analysed at a single central control point.
An example of such a network is the GlacsWeb project
(see ﬁgure 1) [1]. Here, small battery powered sensors
have been embedded into the ice of the Briksdalsbreen
glacier in Norway. Each sensor measures the tempera-
ture, pressure and orientation of the ice and then em-
ploys a store-and-forward data transmission protocol,
whereby, using low power radio transmissions, they are
polled at regular intervals for data by a base station
mounted on the surface of the glacier. The data is then
aggregated and forwarded onto a reference station and,
from here, is sent via standard internet protocols to a
dedicated server for recording and analysis (available
online at http://leo.ecs.soton.ac.uk/glacsweb/).
However, advances in sensor technology are begin-
ning to challenge this architecture. As sensors become
cheaper and easier to deploy, the size of these networks
will undoubtedly increase. In addition, as the sophis-
tication and processing power of the sensors increases,
they are likely to transition from being simple passive
devices that record and transmit local measurements,
to become devices that can actively adjust their con-
ﬁguration to make best use of local resources or ob-
servations. However, it is unlikely that these conﬁg-
uration decisions can be made independently. There
will almost certainly be dependences between the sen-
sors. For example, sensors may be able to indepen-
dently adjust their own sampling and reporting sched-
ules to make more eﬃcient use of their limited battery
power, but if they employ ‘multi-hop’ routing, they
must also coordinate with other sensors to ensure that
these sensors will be active and that there will be a
viable transmission route available when they come to
transmit [7, 8]. In addition, sensors may be able to ful-
ﬁl their sampling requirements, whilst simultaneously
avoiding making and transmitting redundant informa-
tion, by opportunistically and dynamically making use
of the measurements made by other nearby sensors.
In these settings, ﬁnding the optimal conﬁguration
of each sensor within the sensor network becomes a
large combinatorial optimisation problem. It thus be-
comes likely that the capacity of the communication
network over which control and data messages must
be sent and the processing speed of the central control
point become signiﬁcant bottlenecks that limit the ef-
fectiveness of the entire network. This is particularly
true in dynamic environments where many of the most
interesting applications lie, and, as such, decentralised
control regimes that allow the individual sensors to
make autonomous local decisions are particularly at-
tractive.
The rationale for these decentralised approaches is
further strengthened by the observation that as these
sensor networks become ubiquitous within the environ-
ment, it is likely that individual sensors within a partic-
ular network may beneﬁt from interacting with sensors
that are owned by diﬀerent stakeholders. Indeed, these
sensors may have been deployed at a diﬀerent time and
for diﬀerent purposes. For example, a farmer using
a sensor network to measure local weather conditions
(e.g. rainfall, cloud cover, humidity and soil moisture
levels), in order to control an irrigation system, may
beneﬁt from using measurements from neighbouring
landowners in order to track changing local weather
patterns. Moreover, local householders, without envi-
ronmental sensors of their own, may also wish to make
use of information from these sensor networks, in order
to manage their own climate control systems.
Now, these diﬀerent stakeholders may have very dif-
ferent aims or goals; one may wish to conserve the
power and battery life of their own sensors, whilst an-
other may wish to gain the maximum possible infor-
mation in the shortest possible period of time. Thus,
processing and communication bottlenecks aside, the
presense of muliple stakeholders with diﬀerence aims
makes it impossible to identify where a centralised con-
troller should be located, or on whose behalf it should
be acting. As such, we not only require a decentralised
control protocol, but we also require one that allows
these individual stakeholders to work autonomously to-
ward their own individual goals, whilst excluding the
possibility that sensors owned by any one stakeholder
can take unfair advantage of other stakeholders (e.g.by using the communication and power resources of
the other stakeholder to satisfy their own goals with-
out providing anything in exchange or by monopolising
system-wide resources to the detriment of other stake-
holders).
It is this latter requirement that motivates our use
of techniques from computational mechanism design
[5]. These techniques are attractive as the economic
metaphor on which they are predicated naturally de-
scribes systems composed of autonomous agents that
are each attempting to satisfy their own individ-
ual goals under a decentralised control regime. To
date, they have been investigated in applications such
as resource allocation within Grid computing [9, 10]
and routing allocation within communication networks
[11]. However, in order to apply them within the set-
ting of sensor networks in which observations or data
(rather than tasks or resources) are exchanged between
individuals, a valuation metric is required, and we dis-
cuss the valuation metric that we use in the next sec-
tion.
3 Information Valuation Metric
Computational mechanism design provides a princi-
pled framework with which to design systems that ex-
hibit desirable global properties, despite the selﬁsh ac-
tions and goals of the constituent parts [5]. It is an ex-
tension of the economic ﬁeld of mechanism design and
addresses the additional challenges imposed by a com-
putational setting (i.e. agents that are compuationally
limited, communication that is not cost or error free
and settings that are open and dynamic). At its core,
is the notion that agents hold or require valued items,
and are seeking to maximise their own utility through
the exchange of these items. In the real world, these
items may be goods or services, and thus they will have
real monetary value. When applied in the context of
sensors that are exchanging information or observa-
tions within a network, we require a means for the
sensors to place a value on any piece of information or
observation.
Whilst there are many ad hoc means by which a
value can be determined within any particular setting
[12], we use a principled valuation metric that is based
on the Fisher information of each observation [13]. As
such, rather than being restricted to a single setting,
this metric is generic in that it can be applied in any
context where sensors make and exchange imprecise
observations and thus must deal with uncertainty. In
addition, this measure is particularly attractive as un-
der the rules of probabilistic inference, when two inde-
pendent observations are fused, the Fisher information
of the fused estimate is simply the sum of the Fisher
information of the two individual observations. Thus,
if a sensor makes an observation with information con-
tent I1 and also receives an observations from another
sensor with information content I2, the total informa-
tion when these two observations are fused together
is simply I1 + I2. This notion is important as con-
ventional mechanism design assumes that valuations
of goods are additive.
To illustrate this measure, we can initially consider a
simple one-dimensional case in which the sensors make
a single measurement of some physical characteristic of
the environment. Since this observation will typically
be noisy or imprecise, it is common to model the mea-
surement as a Gaussian, whose mean reﬂects the esti-
mated value of the physical characteristic being mea-
sured, and whose variance, σ2, describes how accurate
this measurement is. In the case of this Gaussian dis-
tribution, the Fisher information is simply the inverse
of this variance:
I =
1
σ2 (1)
Thus, as the noise in the measurement decreases, and
thus the variance of the measurement decreases, the
information content of the estimate increases. Hence,
we can use this value, the inverse of the variance, as a
principled measure of the value or information content
of this observation. In the next section we present
a more complex setting and describe how we use the
same information metric to value observations in an
aerial surveillance scenario.
4 Example Information Fusion
Sensor Network Scenario
To illustrate the use and generality of the valuation
metric, we now describe how it was used in a real
world aerial surveillance scenario such as that posed by
disaster relief. In such scenarios, multiple emergency
response agencies with aerial vehicles of diﬀerent capa-
bilities, must interact in order to locate casualties. As
such, each aircraft has an individual goal (e.g. to max-
imise their own information) that may be subject to
rapid changes due to local factors (e.g. a change in the
capability or priority of the aircraft). Thus, the mech-
anisms presented here provide a decentralised control
regime that allows the aircraft to act autonomously
toward their own individual goals, whilst also ensur-
ing that the system as a whole displays desirable and
predictable properties.
Thus, in this case, the sensor network is formed from
sensors that are mounted onboard these aerial vehi-
cles (see ﬁgure 2). Each sensor within the network
is tasked with detecting and tracking multiple targets
within a region of observation immediately surround-
ing itself and is provided with an imprecise estimate of
its own location by the navigation system of the aerial
vehicles to which it is mounted. Within its region of
observation, the sensor is able to estimate the position
of each target by making noisy or imprecise measure-
ments of the range and bearing of the target from itself.
However, in order to better resolve the uncertainty in
these position estimates, the sensors must acquire tar-
get observations from neighbouring sensors and then
fuse these observations with their own.
The sensors are connected together via a commu-
nication network that has a limited bandwidth, and,
thus, there must be some coordination to determine
which observations should be sent to which sensors inFigure 2: Schematic diagram of the network used in our information fusion sensor network application and an
exploded view of sensor 1 making noisy or imprecise range and bearing measurements of several targets within
its region of observation.
order to make best use of this limited global resource.
Now, in conventional architectures, such coordination
is easy to achieve since each sensor is willingly work-
ing toward the goals of the entire system. However, in
our scenario, each sensor may be owned by a diﬀerent
stakeholder and is thus selﬁshly seeking to maximise
the accuracy of their own target position estimates. In
this case, there is no incentive for any sensor to trans-
mit observations to its neighbours. Indeed, each sen-
sor has a positive disinclination to do so, since trans-
mitting observations will occupy valuable bandwidth
which may be used to receive observations from other
agents. Thus our mechanism must incentivise the shar-
ing of observations and ensure that the global resource
of communication bandwidth is used eﬀectively, de-
spite the selﬁsh goals and actions of the participating
sensors.
4.1 Information Valuation Metric
As discussed earlier, in order to apply the tools of
mechanism design we must ﬁrst apply our valuation
metric. Clearly, in this case, it is more complex than
the previous one dimensional example. Rather than
a single environmental parameter, each sensor has an
imprecise estimate of its own location, and imprecise
measurements of the range and bearing to multiple tar-
gets within its own region of observation (see ﬁgure 2).
The uncertainty of these measurements cannot be rep-
resented by a single value of variance, but must be
represented by a covariance matrix (and as in ﬁgure
2, can be shown graphically as a corresponding set of
covariance ellipses).
In more detail, we assume that a sensor has an esti-
mate of its own global coordinate position that is ex-
pressed as a joint Gaussian estimate with mean (x,y)
and covariance P0. If we consider a single target at
(xt,yt), we assume that the sensor makes a noisy range
measurement with mean r and variance σ2
r, and a noisy
bearing measurement with mean θ and variance σ2
θ.
The sensor represents its estimate of its own location
and that of the target by a 4-vector (ˆ x, ˆ y, ˆ xt, ˆ yt). Now,
the total uncertainty in the global coordinate position
of the target, given the uncertainty in the sensors po-
sition and its noisy range and bearing measurements,
can be expressed as a covariance matrix P given by:
P−1 =
￿
P
−1
0 0
0 0
￿
+ dHR−1dHT (2)
where:
R =
￿
σ2
r 0
0 σ2
θ
￿
(3)
and dH is the Jacobian of the observation model H
where:
H(x,y,xt,yt) =
 p
(x − xt)2 + (y − yt)2
arctan
￿
y−yt
x−xt
￿
!
(4)
As before, the information content of the observations
can be calculated as a scalar value by simply calculat-
ing the trace of the inverse of their covariance matrix:
I = Tr(dHR−1dHT) . (5)
Again, this measure is additive when two independent
observations are fused together. Now extending this
representation to any given number and distribution
of targets, allows our sensors to value the information
content of their observation. As before, the more pre-
cise the measurements, the smaller the covariance el-
lipses and thus the greater the information content of
the covariance matrix. In addition, given the infor-
mation content of an observation from another sensor,
the sensor is able to simply sum this value with the
information content of its own observations, in order
to calculate what the total information content will be
after fusing these two observations together.4.2 Mechansim Design
Having derived the valuation metric, we can apply the
mechanism. Our choice here depends on the details
of the scenario and on the global system-wide prop-
erties that we wish to enforce. In this case, we wish
to ensure that the global bandwidth resource is used
eﬃciently (that is, ensure that given the limited band-
width, the information gain of the entire network is
maximised), thus we impose a mechanism whereby sen-
sors are called upon to privately reveal the information
content of observations to an auctioneer. This auction-
eer then allocates the limited bandwidth of the commu-
nication network to those sensors whose observations
will yield the highest system-wide information gain.
However, since each sensor is individually attempt-
ing to maximise its information regarding its own re-
gion of observation, with a simple mechanism there
is an opportunity for a sensor to behave strategically
(e.g. by understating the information content of its
own observations, in an attempt to ensure that band-
width is allocated to other sensors whose observations
it can make use of or by overstating it, in order to deny
bandwidth to other sensors). Such strategic behaviour
is generally undesirable since it reduces the overall eﬃ-
ciency of the network and is computationally expensive
for the individual sensors.
Thus, we have focused our research onto a sub-class
of mechanisms that are said to be strategy-proof or
incentive compatible [5]. That is, within the mecha-
nism, the sensors have a dominant strategy (one which
they should adopt regardless of the behaviour of other
sensors) to truthfully reveal their private information
regarding the value of observations to the auctioneer.
To date, we have explored two settings which diﬀer in
respect of who provides valuation of the observations.
In the ﬁrst, the originator of the information provides
the valuation, and in the second, the destination sensor
provides the valuation.
4.2.1 Originator Sensor Valuation
In this setting, we have considered a sensor network
that uses a broadcast communication protocol. That
is, each sensor transmits its observations to all others,
but the total amount that can be transmitted in any
time frame is constrained. Under this protocol, the
sensors provide the auctioneer with a valuation for the
entire set of their target observations. The auctioneer
uses this information, along with knowledge of which
observations are relevant to which sensor, to calculate
the optimal allocation of bandwidth that maximises
the information gain of the entire network [14]. In ex-
change for sharing observations with other sensors, the
originating sensor receives payments. These payments
are calculated by the auctioneer in order that the sen-
sors maximise their utility (expressed as the sum of
their own individual information gain and payments
that they receive) when they truthfully report their
valuations to the auctioneer1.
1Such payments are most commonly encountered within
Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanisms where they reﬂect
4.2.2 Destination Sensor Valuation
In more recent work, we have extended this mecha-
nism so that rather than transmitting their whole set
of observations, sensors may transmit and exchange
smaller subsets of observations. In addition, we have
relaxed the assumption of a broadcast communication
protocol, and assume that the sensors are connected
by a communication network that allows peer-to-peer
communication, with an overall total bandwidth limit.
In doing so, we have moved the requirement to value
observations from the originator sensor to the receiving
sensor. That is, as part of the auction mechanism, the
receiving sensor receives a sample of the observations
from another sensor, and is required to place a non-
zero valuation on observations of targets that are of
interest. Since, obervations of multiple targets are cor-
related through the imprecise estimate of the sensors’
own location, the valuations of diﬀerent combinations
of targets are super-additive, and thus, this results in
a combinatorial auction. Again, an incentive compati-
ble payment scheme ensures that the individual sensors
maximise their own utility by truthfully reporting their
valuations to the auctioneer.
This mechanism makes more eﬃcient use of the lim-
ited communication bandwidth, but the actual oper-
ation of the allocation mechanism is more costly in
terms of communication and computation. Thus, the
allocation is only performed periodically when a signif-
icant change in the distribution of the targets occurs
(speciﬁcally, when a target enters or leaves the region
of observation of any of the sensors).
4.3 Java Simulation
In order to evaluate and demonstrate these mechan-
sims we have implemented them within a Java simula-
tion where each agent runs in an asynchronous thread
in real time. Figures 3 and 4 shows the system run-
ning with a 3D and an overhead view where the al-
location of bandwidth and the results of the auction
process can be tracked (a Java applet version of this
system is available at http://www.ecs.soton.ac.uk/
∼acr/demonstrator/). At the speciﬁc instance in
time shown in ﬁgure 4, the bandwidth is severely lim-
ited (the graph in the top right of the screen shows
a red line indicating the bandwidth required for full
exchange of observations, a green line indicating the
current bandwidth limit and a blue line that indicates
the bandwidth that is actually being used) and, thus,
although a target falls into the region of observation of
both sensors 2 and 3, there is insuﬃcient bandwidth
for these sensors to exchange observations (allocated
bandwidth is indicated by the yellow lines between
sensors). However, where observations are being ex-
changed (e.g. between sensors 1 and 3), the uncer-
tainty in the position of the targets is resolved, and
thus the covariance ellipses around these targets are
greatly reduced in size and there is an increase in the
the marginal contribution that each agent makes to the over-
all system [5]Figure 3: Example 3D view of the sensor network system showing the current communication allocation.
Figure 4: Example sensor network system showing the auction allocation in process and the resulting commu-
nication allocation.total information gain of the network (shown in the
second graph on the right).
The value of information that each sensor receives
from other sensors and the payments that they receive
in exchange for transmitting their own observations are
shown in the bar-graph at the bottom right of the dis-
play (note that sensors 1 and 4 both have negative
payments since they are currently receiving more in-
formation than they are transmitting; indeed, sensor
4 is transmitting no information at all). When sen-
sors truthfully reveal the information content of their
observations, they maximise their individual informa-
tion gain and maintain their budget of currency (shown
on the right of the display). However, a sensor that
does not adopt this strategy (due to faulty, strategic
or malicious behaviour), will not achieve these aims
and will gradually deplete its budget. Such sensors can
be recognised and removed from the network, thus in-
centivising the truthful reporting that is necessary to
ensure that the constrained bandwidth of the sensor
network is allocated to achieve the system-wide goal of
maximising the information gain of the entire sensor
network.
5 Conclusions
The work described in this paper has shown how we
can apply agent-based control, and speciﬁcally mech-
anism design, within sensor networks, in which the
constituent sensors are owned by diﬀerent stakehold-
ers that have their own goals and objectives. Our sys-
tem has a principled currency grounded in information
theory and uses computational mechanism design to
engineer a sensor network with a particular desirable
system-wide property (in this case, the eﬃcient use of
limited bandwidth capacity), despite the selﬁsh goals
and actions of the individual sensors. Our future work
in this area is following two parallel tracks. In one track
we are investigating the use of decentralised mecha-
nisms in which the role of the auctioneer is distributed
amongst the participating agents. In the second track,
we are extending the range of scenarios considered by
including information fusion whereby the sensors share
not only observations, but state estimates that may
contain correlated information. In this setting, we are
no longer attempting to make the most eﬃcient use of
a global resource, but instead, we are seeking to con-
ﬁgure the sensors (orientating them to track particu-
lar sub-sets of targets) such that the entire network
achieves the maximal uncorrelated information gain.
Whilst this research is ongoing, it is clear that if we are
to build the type of sensor networks described in this
paper, then computational mechanism design oﬀers an
invaluable and powerful set of tools and techniques.
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